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We study a simple, two-stage, stochasticpatent race involving two firms.
We examine the behavior of the participantsas they gain the lead or fall
behind in the race. We find that the leaderengages in R&D more intensively
than does the follower, and that both firmsintensify their efforts if the
follower does catch up with the leader. We alsoanalyze (1) the attractive-
ness of licensing, whereby the leader shares his results with thefollower,
(2) a policy of issuing patents for intermediate researchresults, and (3)
the effects of research joint ventures, whereby the firmscoordinate their











Technological competition often has several of the characteristics of a race.
In a race, the largest (and perhaps only) prize is awarded to the first
participant to cross a well-defined finish line. Similarly, the first firm to
make an industrial breakthrough often captures the largest share of industry
profits. If the discovery is patentable, and "inventing around the patent" is not
possible, then second-place finishers may earn nothing at all. In races other
than sprints, strategy plays a critical role. The participants adjust their
tactics as the race develops, especially in response to changes in their relative
positions. Similarly, in technological competition, it is likely that firms will
vary their efforts depending upon whether they are ahead or behind in the
competition.
The patent-race literature has focused primarily on the first of these
analogies behind technological competition and track events. Lee and Wilde (1980)
and Reinganum (1981), among others, have investigated thoroughly the determinants
of R&D expenditures in situations where the first to succeed captures the largest
(or only) prize. Their analyses embody no notion of progress or leadership,
however; they study stationary races in which all firms are equally placed until
the competition is (suddenly) over.
In this paper we explore the dynamic aspects of R&D rivalry. In particular,
we focus our attention on how effort may vary over the course of a competition, as
one firm initially gains an advantage over its rival, and then (perhaps) the other
draws even again.
Several investigators before us have studied some aspects of non-stationary
R&D races. Fudenberg, et. al., (1983) analyze a model of a multi-stage patent
race, but they severely restrict the firm's abilities to vary their research-2-
intensities. Harris and Vickers (1985) allow for a continuous choice of research
effort by firms, but theirs is a deterministic race in which equilibrium is
characterized by all firms but one exiting the competition right at the outset.
Neither of these specifications is suitable for investigating the dynamics of R&D
rivalry. The paper that is closest in spirit to ours is Judd (1985), which allows
for progress in the context of a stochastic competition. The applicability of
that analysis is limited, however, by the assumption that the winner's prize is of
arbitrarily small value.
Our approach is to extend, in a very straightforward way, the familiar patent
race formulation of Lee and Wilde (1980). We adopt their stochastic structure,
but allow for progress (and the possibility that one firm may be ahead of another)
by introducing a single intermediate step in the research program facing each
firm. Thus, to win the race, a firm in our model must complete two phases of R&D
of equal difficulty. The two stages may be thought of as research and
development, respectively. Each firm is fully informed about the state of
progress of its rival and thus knows immediately if it has taken a lead or fallen
behind. Even with this very simple structure, we find a rich set of
possibilities, depending on the various parameters of the model, for the dynamics
of the race. The theoretical ambiguities that we uncover and discuss are bound to
be present in more complex specifications of multi-stage races.
After describing our model of a two-stage race in the next section, we
proceed in Section III to characterize the dynamics of duopolistic R&D
competition. Then, in Section IV, we turn to a different set of issues that arise
in the context of multi-phase R&D rivalries. These concern the incentives that
exist for various forms of cooperation or competition at different stages of a
technological race. We explore three alternative institutions that alter the
dynamics of R&D rivalry. First, the leader may share its intermediate results-3-
with its competitor under a licensing agreement. Second, the government might
grant a patent to the first firm to achieve an intermediate result, thereby
precluding the continued participation in the race of the loser in the initial
phase. Finally, the firms may establish a common facility for early-stage
research (i.e., form a research joint venture), and then competenoncooperatively
in the development phase to turn basic research results into marketableproducts.
We investigate the effects of each of these alternative institutionalarrangements
on the joint profits of the firms. Our analysis provides guidence in understanding
the circumstances under which these forms of cooperation are mostlikely to arise.
The paper concludes with a brief summary of the findings.
II. A Model of a Two-Stage Race
Two risk-neutral firms compete for a prize of (current) value W. Each
discounts future expenses and earnings at rate r. The prize accrues to the first
firm to complete a research program involving two stages. At each point in timea
finn can choose to remain active by bearing a fixed cost of f >0per unit time1
and can achieve a flow probability (hazard rate) of success at its currentstage
of p per unit time by spending a total amount, including the fixedcost, of c(p)
per unit time.2 We assume that c(O)f, and c'(p) >0and c"(p) >0for all p >
0.The last of these assumptions reflects diminishing returns to R&D effort, due,
1.Sunk costs incurred at the start of the race would not alter the analysis
so long as both firms chose to incur them. If only one firm sinks these
up-front R&D resources, the problem reduces to one of monopoly, which we have
analyzed in an earlier paper, Grossman and Shapiro (1985).
2.Note that we are assuming that the two stages of research are equally
difficult, i.e., the same c(p) function applies at both stages.-4-
for example, to the existence of some fixed factors in the research process such
as a limited supply of promising ideas or talented researchers.
Successful completion of the first stage of the program yields an
"intermediate result". This result has no intrinsic value, but its attainment is
a prerequisite for beginning work on the ultimate phase of research. We assume
that each firm can observe the state of progress of its rival, i.e., whether the
rival has successfully completed the first stage of research or not.3 Clearly,
when one firm has completed the first phase and the other has not, we have a
situation where the former is ahead of the latter in the technological race.
At every point in time, the game we have described can be fully characterized
by the state of progress of each firm. Three types of situations are possible:
(i) when neither firm has achieved the intermediate step; (ii) when one firm (the
leader) has completed the initial phase of R&D, but the other (the follower) has
not; and (iii) when both firms have advanced to the final stage of research. Each
firm chooses whether to remain active, and if so, its instantaneous rate of
expenditure on R&D, as a function of its own position in the race and that of its
rival. We shall refer to p, a firm's flow probability of achieving a breakthrough
in its current phase of research at any instant, as its "speed" or "intensity of
effort".
We employ for this two-stage race the solution concept of sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium. We must, therefore, determine for each possible configuration
the effort devoted to R&D by each of the firms. We denote byp
the per-unit-
3. It would be interesting to explore the (realistic) game of imperfect
information that arises when there are lags in observing the progress of one's
rival. Such an analysis, which is more complex than the one carried out here
due to the continual updating of beliefs and thus behavior by each firm, is
beyond the scope of the present paper.time probability of success of a firm that has completed I stages of the research
program facing a competitor that has completed j stages, for i and j equal to zero
or one. The firms choose their R&D intensities to maximize expected discounted
net profits. The pair of speeds determines the expected payoffs to the rivals,
given the current state of the game. We write these as V.., using the same
subscripting convention as for the hazard rates.
The analysis begins with the most advanced state and works backward. If each
firm already has achieved the intermediate result, the situation is that described
by Lee and Wilde (1980), with their arbitrary market structure replaced by that of
duopoly. If, in such circumstances, firm A chooses an R&Dintensity and its
rival, B, chooses B then its expected payoff VA is given implicitly by
rVA =.c(pA)+A(w-VA)+B(VA) (1)
This equation states that the rate of return on the asset VA is equal to the flow
of "dividends't, -c(p'4), plus any expected capital gains, -VA),and losses,
B A ,A.




Taking as given, firm A chooses to maximize VA. Observe that firm A will
remain active provided that there exists a value of A that makes VA positive.
Such a will exist if and only if W >c(p*)/p*a, where p* is the speed that
minimizes the cost per unit probability of success, c(p)/p, and a is the minimal
average cost. Assuming that this condition is met, differentiation of (2) gives
the first-order condition for firm A's speed:-6-
c(pA)=W- (3)
Thiscondition indicates that a firm's effort is directly related to the size of
the capital gain it will earn if a breakthrough is achieved.
Equation (3) also tells us that the rivals have upward-sloping reaction
curves in (AB) space. The greater is firm B's expenditure rate on R&D, the
more firm A will find it optimal to spend on its own research program. The reason
is that an increase in firm B's expenditure rate reduces and hence increases
the capital gain that firm A would enjoy were it to achieve a laboratory success.
This property of upward-sloping reaction schedules indeed will apply at all stages
of the patent race.4 It implies that R&D expenditures under competitive
conditions exceed the collusive rates that maximizes joint profits.5
The symmetric equilibrium to the sub-game that results if both firms have
A B advanced to the final phase is found by substitutingp11 for p and p and V11
for in equations (2) and (3)6 This substitution leaves the following pair of
simultaneous equations:
4.Straightforward calculations show that for all states of the game a firm's
reaction curve is upward sloping if and only if its expected payoff falls when
its rival completes a phase of the research program. This condition always
applies in the model.
5.If the private payoff to the winning firm coincides with the social
benefit of the discovery, then the fact of upward—sloping reaction curves
implies that resources will be spent on R&D at a socially excessive rate. This
property of stochastic patent races was noted by several earlier authors.
6.Any equilibrium for the sub-game in this state is symmetric, as can be
verified from (3). Firm A selects a higher speed than firm B if any only if
and only if firm A has a smaller expected payoff. But the payoff for firm B







Next we calculate the equilibrium speeds and expected payoffs whenone firm
has completed the initial phase of research but the other has not. Consider the
leader first. If this firm chooses a speedp10 and the follower selects p01,









The last term here represents the capital loss(V11 -V10)that results if the
follower attains the intermediate result, thereby "catching up."Solving this
equation for V10 gives
p10W +p01V11-c(p10) V = (6a) 10 r+p10+p01
The leader will find it optimal to choosep10 >0if and only if W >a,in which
case its optimal intensity obeys
c'(p10) =W-
V10. (7a)
Turning to the follower, it is possible that this firm will find it optimal
to drop out of the competition. This is the case if and only if the value
V11-8-
found from equations (4) and (5) is less than a.7 Then p01 =
V01
=0,and p10 and
V10 are found by substitution p01 =0into equations (6a) and (7a). If V11 >a,
then the expected payoff to the follower is
p V -c(p)
01r+p10+p01





If the follOwer remains in the race, then the simultaneous solution of equations
(6a), (6b), (7a) and (7b) determines the speeds and values in the leader-follower
state.
Finally, we consider the initial phase of the race, that which occurs before
either firm has achieved any progress. Applying reasoning similar to that above,
we note that any equilibrium at this stage is symmetric. The two firms will





7. Since V11 <W/2by equation (4), it is entirely possible that V11 <a<W,




which jointly determinep00 and V.
Solving the entire two-stage race now is merely a matter of recursive
solution of the various sets of equations for each possible state of thegame. In
general, it is not possible to obtain explicit formulas for the optimal speeds.
Nonetheless, we are able to characterize the strategies that are chosen by firms
involved in a two-stage duopolistic patent race. This we do in the next section.
III. The Pattern of R&D Expenditures
In this section we examine how a firm engaged in a race alters its behavior
over time, when it pulls ahead of or falls behind its rival, and when it or the
rival draws even again. Our main conclusions are that the leader always devotes
more resources to R&D than does the follower, but if the latter happens to catch
up, both firms intensify their efforts. Regarding the transition of the race from
its initial state to one where one of the firms pulls ahead, we find that it is
theoretically possible for either or both firms to speed up or slow down in the
event of an intermediate breakthrough by one of them. Numerical simulations
conducted over a wide range of parameter values for our model (with a particular
functional form for the cost function) suggest that perhaps the most typical
outcome is one where the firm that takes the lead intensifies its effort as a
consequence, while its rival reduces its rate of spending.
We establish first that the (former) leader augments its R&D efforts when its
rival succeeds in attaining the intermediate result, i.e.,p11 >p10.From
equations (5) and (7a) and the fact that c" >0it is immediate that p11 >
p10
if
and only if V11 <
V10.Arguing by contradiction, suppose that V11 >V10and hence-lo-
p10 >p11.In this event, it is easy to show (by differentiatingV10 in (6a) with
respect to p01) that the leader's reaction curve must be downward sloping. But
then p10 must be smaller than the leader's optimal response top01 =0,say p.
But p, which maximizes [pW -c(p)]/(r+p),also is the optimal speed for a firm
facing a rival who has also completed the initial stage, if the latter happens to
choose to devote no resources to R&D. Since the reaction curves in the state when
both firms are working on the second stage of research must be upward sloping, we
have p11 >p.It follows, therefore, thatp11 >p10,a contradiction that
establishes our claim.
Next we show that when one firm is ahead and the other behind, the leader's
speed exceeds that of the follower, i.e.,p10 >p01.In combination with the
previous results, this also will serve as proof of our claim that the (former)
follower increases its effort if it manages to draw even, i.e.,
p11 > p01.
From equations (7a) and (7b) and the fact that c" > 0,p10 > p01 if and
only if W -
V10
> V11 -V01.Substituting for V10 from (6a) and for V01 from










Again arguing by contradiction, suppose thatp01 > p10. Using the convexity of
the c(p) function, this would imply that c(p01) -c(p10)
< (p01 -p10)c'(p01).











where the equality follows from equation (7b).
We now can show that if the inequality in (11) is satisfied, that in (10)
must be so as well. Inequality (11) implies that the sum of the last two terms in
(10) is positive. But W >
2V11(see equation (4)), so the first two terms of (10)
are also positive. Thus, under the working hypothesis that p01 >p10,which gave
us inequality (11), inequality (10) is satisfied, implying p10 >p01.This
contradiction establishes that in fact p10 >p01,i.e., the leader's speed exceeds
that of the follower.
Our result that both the leader and the follower redouble their efforts if
the race becomes tied reflects the fact that the former has more to lose and the
latter more to win when the competition is even than when one firm is ahead. The
tendency to speed up is exacerbated by the positive competitive response of each
to the change in behavior of the other.
Comparing the two states of the game that have the two firms on equal
footing, we find that the intensity of competition is greater after the
intermediate result has been attained by each. To see this, note from equations

















straightforward (and intuitive) but tedious to show that V00 >V01,i.e., that
falling behind at the initial stage of the race entails a capital loss. It





V00and that p11 >p00.
Finally, we compare the starting speeds with those that are chosen after one
firm has captured a lead in the patent race. We have established by means of
constructed examples that any relationship betweenp10, p01 and p00 with p10 >
p01is a possible outcome. After explaining why this is the case, we report
numerical simulation results which explore the comparative statics of our model inorder to gain an understanding of when the various possible dynamic paths are most
likely to occur.
First consider the behavior of a firm that pulls ahead in the race. On the
one hand, its rival may react to having fallen behind by reducing its speed or
even by dropping out of the race entirely. Given the fact of upward-sloping
reaction curves, this diminished rivalry effect tends to cause the leader to
moderate its efforts. On the other hand, the leader has advanced towards the
finish line by making the intermediate discovery. This pure progress effect tends
to cause the leader to increase its expenditures on R&D, so long as the discount
rate is positive. In fact, we have shown in Grossman and Shapiro (1985) that a
single firm pursuing a multi-stage research program of the form analyzed here
will, absent rivalry, always increase effort with each increment of progress,
provided that r >0.
The follower also is subject to conflicting forces. The fact that its rival
already has achieved the intermediate result means that its reward from completing
the initial task is smaller, i.e., V11 <V10.This diminution of the potential
reward to a breakthrough might cause it to reduce the intensity of research or to
abort the program altogether, independent of the leader's pace. If, however, the
follower chooses to continue racing, and if the leader speeds up upon making the
intermediate discovery, then the follower actually may increase its efforts in a
positive (upward-sloping reaction) to the leader's increased outlays.
We simulated the model under the assumption of a constant elasticity of
e .. variablecosts, c(p) =f+p,fora range of elasticities, e, greater than one.-13-
Wealso varied extensively the other parameters of the model, W, r and f.8 We
found that, if the follower drops out of the contest (p01 =0),then the leader
increases its speed (p10 >p00)if the interest rate is large. A high interest
rate implies a dominant pure progress effect. The leader also is more likely to
speed up when the rival exits the race if the elasticity of the cost-of-progress
function is large. In such circumstances, because it is costly to increase the
probability of discovery, competition at the start of the race does not push the
speeds to very high levels. Then, when one firm drops out upon falling behind,
the removal of the competitive interaction does not have a quantitatively large
impact on the behavior of the remaining firm.
For most of the combinations of parameter values that we investigated, if the
follower remains active, then the leader works more intensively after the





>0,however; these occurred for small values of e.
Turning to the behavior of the follower, this firm is most likely to cease
its research operations upon falling behind if fixed costs are large, the prize is
small, the elasticity of the cost function is large or the discount factor is
large.9 If this firm does remain active, it is likely to reduce the size of its
R&Dexpenditures.Indeed, in all of our simulations we did not find a single
instance where the competitive response to the actions of the leader was
sufficiently large for the firm that fell behind to intensify its efforts.
8.The ranges over which parameters were varied are as follows: W from 20
through 500, f from 10 through 200, r from 0 through 100, and e from 1.5 to
8.0. For the most part, these ranges were determined by the computer's
numerical limitations.
9.For the constant elasticity(co,function the stopping rule for the
follower is V11 <a=e[f/(e-1)]'
'
.•Largevalues of r and small values of
W yield small values for V11.-14-
However, a simple analytical example suffices to demonstrate that such an outcome
cannot be ruled out on theoretical grounds. Suppose that the discount rate is
zero and only two levels of effort are possible, these yielding flow probabilities
of discovery per unit time of q1 and q2 with q1 <q2.The cost of research is nil
if q1 is chosen, while c(q2) =c.Then, if
q1 +3q W(q2 -q1)<4






In this example, each firm would prefer to proceed at the slower pace throughout
the race provided that its rival did so as well, but each speeds up after the
initial phase in response to the other's having done so.
Pulling our findings together, we depict in Figure 1 a typical pattern for a
two-stage R&D race. At time t1, firm A attains the intermediate result and begins
work on the final stage of the research project. Sensing victory, this firm
intensifies its efforts, while a discouraged firm B reduces the scope of its
operations. At time t2, firm B achieves a breakthrough in its phase-one research,
and draws even in the race. Thereafter the firms compete intensively, until the
final stage is completed by one of them at t3, and the patent is awarded.
IV. Licensing Arrangements, Intermediate Patents and Research Joint Ventures
We turn now to a variety of questions regarding the incentives that firms
have to cooperate (partially) during the course of a multi-stage patent race. Our
analysis focuses on three institutional arrangements that are observed in some,
but not all, instances of technological competition. These are:(i) licensing-15-
contracts, whereby the leading firm in an industry shares its superior knowledge
with one or more of its rivals in exchange for the payment of a royaltyfee; (ii)
the granting of "intermediate patents't, whereby the leading firm ina
technological race is declared by the policy authority to be the winner before it
has completed all the stages of development of an innovation thatare necessary to
yield a marketable product; and (iii) research joint ventures, whereby the firms
agree to join forces in conducting certain phases of a larger research agenda.
Our analysis sheds light on what factors influence the attractiveness to thefirms
of these various arrangements.
A. Licensing
Once one firm in a multi-stage patent race has concluded an initialphase of
research that its rivals have not, the leader may have an incentive to make its
findings available to some of the other firms for a fee. Of course, certain
informational and bargaining obstacles will need to be overcome beforean
agreement can be reached. These are beyond the scope of the present paper, as we
address only the issue of whether or not there are potential gains from trade in
information (i.e., the intermediate result) in our model.
The question of the existence of potential gains from trade involvesa
comparison of total industry "profits" with and without a licensing arrangement.
If licensing occurs, both firms will be engaged in the finalstage of research
with a joint value of 2V11. In the absence of licensing, the firms togetherenjoy-16-
expected profits of V10 ÷ V01. So, in our model, licensing can increase joint
profits if 2V1 >V10
+
V01.10
Licensing is jointly attractive to the firms because it allows the follower
to advance towards the finish line without expending furtherresources on the
intermediate result.'1 Clearly, in any realization of the race in which the
follower eventually draws even, the firms ex post would wishthey had concluded a
licensing agreement. In addition, a licensing arrangement causes the follower to
remain in the competition in situations where dropping out is otherwiseoptimal
for this firm. While this may involve a waste of resources (if the leaderis the
first to make the final discovery in any event), it can enhanceindustry R&D
efficiency. So long as the fixed costs, f, are not too large, the increasing
marginal costs in any particular laboratory imply that a given probability of
success can be achieved more efficiently by operating two labs rather than one.
This increased efficiency effect is most pronounced when the firmsare in a rush
to reach the finish line, i.e., when the future is heavily discounted.
Licensing also has a drawback from the perspective of the two firms in a
dupolistic patent race. A licensing agreement is bound to intensify competition
between the firms, sincep11 exceeds both p10 and p01. Absent licensing, the
10. Of course, the feasibility of licensing will alter firmst incentives at
the start of the race. This ex ante effect may stimulate or retard the
discovery of the intermediate result by one of them, depending upon how the
gains from trade will be split between the licensee and the licensor. See Katz
and Shapiro (1984a and 1984b) and Shapiro (1985). Due to the existence of this
ex ante effect, the firms may seek ways of pre'-committing not to license to
their rivals even in instances where ex post gains from trade will be
available. Such means of pre-commitment may be difficult to find.
11. A second lab could also be put to work on the final research stage if the
leader could acquire the follower's laboratory. If feasible, this would clearly
dominate licensing, as the two labs' research intensities could be set
cooperatively. We assume that it is not possible to trade the specific assets
that constitute a lab.—17—
period of intense competition might be avoided altogether, if the leader completes
the research program before the follower makes anyprogress. Indeed, this outcome
will surely arise in situations where the follower drops out of the race. The
increased rivalry that licensing engenders may or may not dominate the
"resource-free progress" that the follower can achieve by means of this
arrangement.
In our simulation exercise we foundpotentialgains to licensing in a variety
of circumstances. In situations where the follower would drop out absenta
licensing agreement, licensing raises industry expected profits when the discount
rate is high or, for a given positive discount rate, when the elasticity of the
R&Dcostfunction is sufficiently large. A high discount rate makes it optimal
for the firms to proceed quickly, and in such cases a second lab with itsown
supplyof ideas and skilled personnel can be especially valuable. Similarly, for
a given value of r >0,the larger is the value of e the greater is the efficiency
gain from running two labs rather than one. Whenr =0,however, it is efficient
from the industry point of view to operate a single lab at the scale that achieves
the minimum average cost of progress, c.
In cases where the follower remains active, licensing is most likely to be
jointly profitable when the rivalry to which it gives rise in the final phase of
the race is not so intense. Thus, a high value of e is conducive to licensing;
when the marginal cost of increasing the probability of success is high, the firms
will not be tempted to do so to as great an extent. The same reasoningsuggests
that licensing will be viewed more favorably when the prize is small. Finally, a
high discount rate is conducive to licensing, even if the follower stays in the
race, because it reduces the expected time to discovery. These intuitive
propositions were borne out consistently in our simulations, although we were
unable to prove general results using analytical methods.-18-
B. Intermediate Patents
We now inquire as to whether the firms wouldsupport ex ante a policy that
awarded a patent at the intermediate stage of the innovation process.12 While
current U.S. policy stipulates that patents are to be granted only for "useful"
innovations, there may be considerable scope for discretion on thepart of the
patent-granting authority concerning what satisfies this criterion. A patentmay
well be awarded at a stage where substantial additionaldevelopment expenses will
be necessary before the product can be made available toconsumers.
If an intermediate patent is issued, the firm that fails to make theinitial
discovery first would be legally required to drop out of the race. From anex
p point of view (i.e., once the intermediate result has been attained by one of
the firms), this would raise industry expected profits if theexpected payoff to a
firm proceeding to the second stage of research withoutcompetition, say Vm
exceeds the sum of the two firms' payoffs,V10 +V1,in the event of continued
rivalry. The ex post benefit of an intermediate patent to the firms (which, of
course, accrues more than fully to the leader at that stage) is that it removes
the extra cost of competition in the later stages of development. Thecost of
such a patent is that it reduces by one the number of activelaboratories, thereby
12.If the private prize W happens to coincide with the socialbenefit, as,
for example, when the winning firm can practice perfectprice discrimination or
when all of the resulting product is to be sold in export markets, then the
question of whether the two firms would prefer the granting of intermediate
patents coincides with the normative question of what should be appropriate
patent policy from a social welfare perspective. Of course, in general the
private prize and the social benefits will differ. Surplus that accrues to
domestic consumers as a result of the discovery causes the social benefit to
exceed the private prize, while reductions in profits of firms not active in
the race under consideration work in the opposite direction. We do notpursue
the social welfare analysis more fully, as the line of reasoning is rather
clear. For example, if the consumer benefits are significant, thenany
policies or institutional arrangements that cause the firms to conduct research
more intensively will be relatively more attractive than otherwise.—19—
decreasing the efficiency of research for a given industry-wideprobability of
success.




V01except when r is large or e is large. A high discount rate
make it desirable to complete the research projectquickly. Then it is most
inefficient to have one of the labs inoperative,especially if diseconomies of
scale are substantial.
The fact that V >V+Vis neither necessary nor sufficient for the m 10 01
firms to favor the granting of intermediatepatents, however. The patent regime
also effects the intensity of competition, and thus theexpected resource
expenditure in the initial phase of research prior to the intermediatediscovery.
If an intermediate patent increases expectedindustry profits measured from the
time that the initial stage has been completed, but itcauses competition to be
more intense at the outset, then it may lower ex ante industryprofits.
Similarly, an alleviation of competition at the start of the racecan compensate
for a shortfall of V in comparison toV10 +V01and cause the firms to support a
policy of intermediate patent awards.




V01,competition at the start of the race is more intense under a regime
with intermediate patents than under one without.Thus, for a range of parameter
values, intermediate patents appear beneficial to the firms (taken together)ex
post, but not ex ante. Nonetheless, for combinations of values of r and e
somewhat smaller than the ones that yield higher exst expected industry profits
under an intermediate patent regime, the granting of suchpatents also yields
expected benefits to the firms before the race starts.-20-
C. Research Joint Ventures
The final form of potential cooperation that we consider is a research joint
venture (RJV). We assume that such a venture enables the firms to coordinate
their research activities during the first stage of the R&D program. When the
intermediate result is achieved, both firms then have access to it. We do not,
however, allow for synergies in research to be enjoyed on account of a joint
venture. In other words, we assume that the research technology is unaffected by
the formation of an RJV. We also assume that joint research is not feasible
13 during the second stage of the project. This assumption corresponds to an
interpretation of the two-stage innovation process where the first stage is
"research,t' a public good, and the second stage is firm-specific "development".
Under the R&D technology we have specified, the firms engaged in a research
joint venture may prefer to operate either one laboratory or two. By running only
one lab, the firms can conserve on fixed costs of equipment and administration.
However, the coordination of efforts and activities which imparts administrative
savings may also entail a reduction in the variety of approaches that can be
pursued. Given the assumption of decreasing returns to devoting more resources to
a fixed supply of ideas and techniques, it may be more efficient for the firms to
forego the (fixed) cost savings associated with a unified operation, and to use
13.If feasible, the firms would always choose to coordinate their research
activities in our model once the intermediate result has been attained by both
of them. Doing so allows the rivals to avoid excess competition in the last
phase of the race. However, in many applications, it would not be reasonable
to maintain the assumption that the size of the prize would be unaffected by an
RJVthatallowed both firms to have access to the ultimate innovation. In such
circumstances, competition might arise in the product market thereby eroding
the monopoly profits attached to the patent. For an analysis of the
desirability of RJV's with a single stage of research and subsequent product
market competition, see Katz (1984).-21-
the joint venture only as a means to collusively set theresearch outlays at each
of two separate facilities.14
In general, an RJV tends to increase the jointexpected profits of the
patent-race participants for two reasons. First, it eliminatesprofit-dissipating
rivalry at the initial stage of the research program. Second, byensuring that
both firms have access to the intermediate resultas soon as a breakthrough is
achieved in any lab; it (like licensing) allows the firmsto avoid the wasteful
duplication of effort associated with the followerattempting to gain a state of
knowledge that has already been achieved by the leader. On thenegative side, an
RJV guarantees that the firms will need to endure themost intensively competitive
of the various states of the patentrace, that when both firms simultaneously are
15 seeking the final result. Absent an RJV, this potentially costly state can be
avoided if the leader happens to complete both phases of theresearch program
before the follower is able to progress to the intermediatepoint.
In our simulations, we indeed found constellations ofparameters such that
expected industry profits are smaller with an RJV than withunmitigated rivalry at
the initial stage. These arose for large fixed costsor small prizes, in
14. It is not clear, however, that a research joint ventureinvolving no
common research facility, but only an agreement to coordinate research budgets,
would win approval from antitrust authorities.
15.In this regard, the RJV is similar to the licensingarrangement, which, as
we noted, also is subject to this potential drawback. In fact, in situations
where licensing would take place, an RJV is a strictlysuperior arrangement
from the point of view of the two firms. Both regimesensure transition to a
stage where each firm has access to the intermediate result as soon as one of
the labs achieves success, but the RJV involves coordination ofexpenditures at
the initial stage as well.-22-
situations where the follower would choose to drop out of the race entirely,
16 absent an RJV.
We have identified a new reason why research joint ventures may fail to
appeal to rival researchers. The traditional reason is that joint ventures
generally involve increased coordination and administrative costs. Another problem
is that a joint venture might reduce the diversity of research paths that are
pursued. Even absent these factors, we have shown that an RJV may reduce members'
profits by increasing their direct rivalry after the venture's results are made
available to its members.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we explored the dynamics of R&D competition that result when
two firms engage in a patent race. We adopted a simple structure in which a
research program requires the sequential completion of two phases of equal
difficulty. Following the literature on single-stage patent races, we assumed
that success at each stage is subject to uncertainty, and that the flow
probability per unit time of a breakthrough increases when more resources are
devoted to the project. This structure was sufficiently rich to allow us to
analyze how a firm will alter its behavior if it captures a lead, falls behind in
the race, or if it sees a former lead or deficit eliminated.
16. Note that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for an RJV to be
undesirable that the follower would drop out of the race. It is possible to
construct a two-speed, no-discounting example, such as the one described in
Section III, in which for certain parameter values the follower remains active
(albeit at the slow speed) under competition, and yet this regime is preferable
to an RJV. And when the follower does cease operations, an RJV nonetheless
might be profit-enhancing due to its moderating effect on expenditures at the
start of the race.-23-
We found that competition is most intense when both firms are even and each
has completed the initial phase of the research project. When a lagging firm
draws even with a rival that was formerly ahead in therace, both competitors
respond by increasing their research efforts.
We also found that when the two firms are at different stages in the
innovation process, the one that is ahead has a greater incentive to invest in R&D
than the one that is behind. This result is reminiscent of another proposition in
the R&D literature, namely that the firm with lower initial costs in a Cournot
duopoly has a greater incentive than its rival to engage in cost-reducing R&D.
The response of either firm to one of them becoming the first to achieve the
intermediate result is theoretically ambiguous. Numerical simulations for a wide
range of parameter values suggest that a typical pattern has the leading firm
increasing its R&D expenditures when it advances to the final phase, while the
follower reduces the extent of its research activity.
Finally, we used the two-stage patent race model to study the incentives that
rival firms have to engage in various forms of cooperation during the course ofa
technological competition. The desirability of licensing agreements after one of
the firms has achieved some progress, of a public policy that grantspatents at an
intermediate stage in the innovation process, and of research joint ventures that
allow the firms to coordinate their activities in the early stages of an R&D
program all hinge on the various parameters of the model. In general, these
alternative forms of cooperation are most likely to increase joint expected
profits when the competition that would arise absent any such arrangement would be
quite intense. Competitive pressures are most severe when the prize being sought
is large, the discount factor is high and the marginal cost of augmenting the flow
probability of success at each stage of research rises slowly.-24-
REFERENCES
Fudenberg,D., Gilbert, R., Stiglitz, J., and Tirole, J. (1983) "Preemption,
Leapfrogging and Competition in Patent Races," European Economic Review, 22,
pp. 3-31.
Grossman, G. and Shapiro, C. (1985) "Optimal Dynamic R&DPrograms,"Discussion
Paper in Economics No. 94, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.
Harris, C. and Vickers, J. (1985) "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race,"
Review of Economic Studies, 52, pp. 193-209.
Judd, K. (1985) "Closed-Loop Equilibrium in a Multi-Stage Innovation Race,"
Discussion Paper No. 647, Management Economics and Decision Science, Kellogg
Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.
Katz, H. (1984) "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development," Discussion
Paper in Economics No. 76, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.
Katz, H. and Shapiro, C. (1984a) "On the Licensing of Innovations," Discussion
Paper in Economics No. 82, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.
Katz, N. and Shapiro, C. (1984b), "Perfect Equilibrium in a Development Game with
Licensing or Imitation," Discussion Paper in Economics No. 85, Woodrow Wilson
School, Princeton University.
Lee, T. and Wilde, L. (1980) "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, pp. 429-436.
Reinganum, J. (1981) "Dynamic Games of Innovation," Journal of Economic Theory,
25, pp. 21-41.
Shapiro, C.. (1985) "Patent Licensing and R&DRivalry,"American Economic Review,
75, pp. 25-30.Figure 1






I I I I
, I
FirmB
.time ti t2 t3